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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DAVID MADSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED TELEVISION, INC., 
a Delaware Corporation, 
and JOHN HARRINGTON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Civil No. C88-1933 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this 
appeal, in that, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 5 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was granted on the 
17th day of January, 1989. 
This Interlocutory Appeal is taken from an Order granting summary 
judgement to Respondent on Appellant's First Cause of Action entered on the 2nd 
day of December, 1988, by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Homer Wilkinson, presiding. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for review in this appeal: 
1. Is a police patrolman a public official strictly by virtue of his position. 
2. Should factual issues relating to a libel Appellant's status as a public 
official be decided by the Court or presented to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, in the above-entitled matter, initiated the original action in the 
lower court by filing a Verified Complaint on the 24th day of March, 1988 against 
United Television and John Harrington on a cause of action in defamation. On the 
18th day of November, 1988, Respondent United Television's Motion for Summary 
Judgement on Appellant's First Cause of Action was heard by the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge 
Homer Wilkinson, presiding. Said First Cause of Action sets out that Appellant is 
not a public person, that neither the facts of the incident [set out below] nor the 
incident itself gave rise to a special privilege and that Respondents were negligent 
in airing their television story about Appellant. 
Subsequently, on the 2nd day of December, 1988, the Honorable Homer 
Wilkinson issued an Order granting United Television's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgement on Appellant's First Cause of Action, finding no material issue of fact. 
Appellant filed, in a timely manner, a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal from 
said Order and that Petition was granted by this Court on the 17th day of January, 
1989. 
B. FACTS 
David Madsen, hereinafter referred to as Madsen, is employed as a senior 
patrolman with the Salt Lake City Police Department and has been with the 
Department for over seven years. The Salt Lake City Police Department is a major 
metropolitan police department employing a total force of over 470 people. 
As a patrolman, Appellant Madsen has direct and continuous contact with the 
public but is only in the position to enforce the policies of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, policies set by his superiors. He, as the other more than 200 patrolman 
in Salt Lake City, is not employed by the Department in a policy-making capacity. 
During his tenure on the Salt Lake Police Department, Appellant Madsen has 
performed no acts suggesting or indicating that he has any desire to be thrust into 
the public spotlight nor has he, in his position as a patrolman or in any other 
capacity, been a public spokesman on any subject. 
On or about October 26, 1987, patrolman Madsen was one of a number of law 
enforcement agents involved in a shooting incident in which one Clemente Garcia 
was killed. Appellant Madsen was the patrolman who fired the fatal shot. The 
incident of Mr. Garcia's death received attention from both press and television 
media in the Salt Lake County area. KTVX television additionally focused attention 
on Appellant Madsen, his conduct at the scene of the shooting and his background 
and history in addition to the incident and events surrounding Clemente Garcia. 
Appellant Madsen alleges in his Complaint that the allegations which the 
Respondents' broadcast generated, involving both his personal reputation, his 
conduct as a Salt Lake City patrolman and his conduct as a law enforcement agent, 
are defamatory. 
Appellant Madsen alleges in his First Cause of Action that he is not and has 
never been a public person or official, but rather is only a private individual who is 
employed as a patrolman by the Police department, and as such, Respondents are 
not entitled to the additional protections and special privileges granted to the media 
when dealing with persons who are categorized as public or official personalities. 
Respondents'Motion for Partial Summary Judgment deals only with the Appellant's 
First Cause of Action and the status of Appellant as either a public person or a 
private individual for the purposes of application of the law of defamation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The determination of Appellant's status is the key to the resolution of this 
appeal and there are, for the purpose of this Appeal only two possible categories. 
Either 1) the Appellant is a private individual, who has no decision or policy-making 
responsibilities and is not in the public spotlight, or 2) he is an official and/or public 
person, one who has voluntarily sought after public scrutiny and as a matter of 
course sets policy and procedure in a broad scope. This question of status is of major 
importance in this Appeal in that it is upon this decision that the further question 
of the requirement of malice in defamation will be founded. 
Appellant Madsen is a patrolman in the Salt Lake City Police Department. 
His duties as a patrolman include vehicular patrol of the city's streets, answering 
calls from his dispatcher to cover emergencies in progress and in general protecting 
the local citizenry from itself. His duties do not include deciding what is lawful and 
what is against the law. He does not decide what the city's policy will be on police 
duty hours or schedules, he does not even, for that matter set his own schedule or 
patrol routine. He does not even get to decide what the contents of his patrol vehicle 
will be. He is only one of over two hundred other patrolman in the Department who 
do a fairly routine job on a fairly routine basis. He is not a public figure in the sense 
that he would have to be for Respondents' to prevail. 
Neither Patrolman Madsen nor his involvement in the Garcia shooting is a 
subject of public interest. There will always be those individuals in our modern 
society who will seek out gory, gruesome or spectacular events. Fortunately that is 
not the norm. There will also always be those individuals who pander to those tastes. 
That is unfortunate. The shooting of Mr. Garcia was only one of approximately 
120,000 incidents which required police assistance in 1987. How much of a spotlight 
should that one incident have occupied? 
As this determination of status is of such tremendous importance in 
defamation cases and, more significantly, since the facts in each case vary so greatly 
then the decision should be one made by a jury, as a finder of fact, instead of by a 
court, as a question of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE POSITION OF PATROLMAN SHOULD NOT 
MAKE AN INDIVIDUAL A PUBLIC PERSON AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The law of defamation requires that a fine balance be struck between the need 
to protect those people who would offer criticism of the government and the 
importance of the protection of the reputation of individuals. In New York Times 
Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, (1964), the Supreme Court provided a 
qualified privilege against liability for defamation. This privilege did not apply, 
however, in cases involving a public official. Should such a public official status be 
found, then actual malice must be proved. On the other hand, the common law held 
reputation in such esteem that defamation was the basis for damage regardless of 
evidence of loss. Balancing the two points projects the specter of a rather wide gulf 
of treatment. One that has become the focal point of the law of defamation and libel 
was illustrated most clearly in Gertz v. Welsh, 418 U.S. 323, (1974). In Gertz, the 
United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to balance the interest of the 
media to report the news against that of the private citizen to protect his reputation. 
The Court affirmed the logic of the New York Times privilege with respect to 
defamation, but only in its application to public officials or public figures. The 
private individual was to remain unaffected by this privilege. Id. at 351. Thus, in the 
wake of Gertz, the determination of the status of the individual becomes a 
significant aspect of each and every defamation or libel case. It is a significant 
aspect in this case. 
A. 
APPELLANT IS A PRIVATE PERSON FOR THE 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND 
DEFAMATION. 
The trial court held that the mere label of Appellant Madsen as a patrolman 
elevates him to the status of "public official". The argument of Respondent adopted 
by the Court is based upon the analysis of the Supreme Court in Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 386 U.S. 75 (1966) and its progeny. The Rosenblatt Court determined that 
public off icials were "those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, 
or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the 
conduct of governmental affairs." /rf.at 85.Additionally, they held positions which 
have "such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the 
qualification and performance of the person who holds i t . . .". Id. at 86. 
In the wake of Rosenblatt, lower courts have struggled with the definition of 
what constitutes the public official, what consortium of factors create a public 
official such that he does not need the protection of Sullivan and Gertz. It could 
not mean all persons employed by government, though it could be narrowed down 
some what by including those who depend upon the electoral process for their 
position within this gambit. Those who are employed by public agencies create a 
much more difficult, factual situation. For example, those in clear positions of 
leadership a I authority qualify as public officials, while those at lower levels may 
not. Most d icult of all is the treatment to be accorded patrolman on the police 
forces of Air rican cities, towns and villages. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
supra, dealt ith a Commissioner of police, an elected official, who was clearly 
found to be c mblic official. But the New York Times Court reserved the issue of 
the depth of ank to which the status of public official would extend. Id. at 283. 
Likewise, Pi :e v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 676 F.Supp. 1501, 1511-1512 (D.Minn. 
1988), the F Jeral District Court in Minnesota recognized that, within a police 
department, lere must be distinctions based on rank, responsibility and duties that 
must be mac on a factual basis. The trial court in the instant case allowed no such 
distinction b t ruled instead that as a matter of law all police personnel were public 
officials. 
Althoi h it has been recognized, on a practical basis, that a patrolman is the 
lowest ranki g individual within the police establishment, even that status has not 
provided ck r cut basis for making a decision on public versus private individual. 
The Appell e Court in Illinois found such an individual to have "substantial 
responsibili for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs" and thus, to 
beapublicc icial. Courseyv. GreaterNilesTownshipPublishing Corp.,239 
N.E.2d 837 1968). The Court of Appeals in Kentucky, however, disagreed, 
protecting t t status of the individual of the patrolman as a private person. "The 
freedom of linhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues guaranteed 
by the First Amendment cannot sensibly be turned into an open season to shoot 
down the good name of any man who happens to be a public servant." Tucker v. 
Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (1965). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, however, 
determined that the issue was not one to be determined as a matter of law but was 
rather a factual issue to be left to the jury. "We are satisfied that a patrolman should 
not be considered a public official as a matter of law." Nash v. Keene Publishing 
Corporation, 498 A.2d 348 (1985). 
Logic would dictate that the job of the Appellant should not alone serve as 
the litmus test for determination of status, unless it bestows unquestionable 
responsibilities and authority. Lower ranking individuals or those were the picture 
is not so clearly outlined should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 
An important reason for the different standard for public officials is the 
inherent power that goes with the job of such a public official and the ability of that 
official to protect himself in such a situation. "Public officials and public figures 
usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective 
communications and hence, have more realistic opportunity to counteract false 
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore 
more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is 
correspondingly greater." Gertz v. Welch. 418 U.S. at 344. The public official can 
speak and anticipate that media will listen and broadcast his words. The private 
individual enjoys no such ability. While he may protest his innocence, it will most 
likely be heard only in the small circle of his acquaintances. 
It is important in deciding the public status of the Appellant to determine the 
relative power and authority that the Appellant held by virtue of his position. In 
Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588 (10th C.A. 1981), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that being a street patrolman in a town of only 30,000 elevated that individual 
to the status of a public official. The Court determined the size of the town 
significant. The relationship of the Appellant to his vicinage and the status incurred 
therefrom must be a consideration in the determination of his categorization as a 
public or private person. While Gray may have only been a patrolman, the 30,000 
person population of Rock Springs gave that status extra meaning in terms of his 
perceived position in the community. To the contrary, in the instant case. Appellant 
Madsen enjoyed no power or importance due to his position. He was only one of 438 
people on the Salt Lake City Police Department in 1987. Of those 438, 233 of them 
were actual patrolman, 43 were sergeants, 18 - lieutenants, 9 - captains, and 3 -
majors. [Figures obtained from the Salt Lake City Police Department for the year 
1987]. All this in a city of approximately 155,000 to 160,000 people. The facts, on 
their face, are patently different from those which the Coursey court faced in 
Illinois. Yes, In the Coursey situation the patrolman could be seen as a public 
official occupying the public interest. In Salt Lake the above numbers should point 
to a different conclusion. 
Appellant took on importance as an individual, not because of his role in the 
shooting of Clemente Garcia but only as a result of the attacks initiated upon him by 
the Respondents singling him out by name as the perpetrator of odious deeds, 
claiming not only his responsibility for the death of Clemente Garcia but for 
endangering the safety of other patrolman in the field. 
Another basis for being found to be a public figure is where one has thrust 
himself upon the public scene and by his own acts and conduct makes himself a part 
of public controversy. Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (1979). Clearly 
in such cases, the Appellant, having placed himself in the public eye, should not be 
heard to complain about the scrutiny he receives thereby or, as alternately stated, 
having placed himself in the limelight, he cannot complain of the heat. Elected 
officials are dependent upon such actions to maintain their positions, but low level 
police employees have no job related interest in doing so. Appellant Madsen did 
not thrust himself into the public eye. He arrived there only through the efforts of 
the Respondents, and clearly against his will. 
As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court 
in the Gertz decision left largely to the States the determination of the standards for 
defamation against private individuals and the proper foundation for application of 
the New York Times qualified privilege. Seegmiller v.KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 
(1981). The Seegmiller Court recited the importance of protecting individuals 
from defamation. "For centuries it has been recognized that an assault upon a 
person's character may be far more damaging and long lasting than an assault upon 
his person. Indeed, freedom from false attacks on one's personality may be viewed 
as at least as essential to orderly liberty as freedom from physical abuse." Id. at 973. 
In Seegmiller, the Utah Court, in attempting to reach a balance of these very 
important interests, looked at some of the key elements that distinguished the 
private from the public person: 
1. The private citizen is an involuntary news figure. 
2. The private individual has little opportunity to rebut effectively false 
charges which are made against him. 
3. Information concerning public officials is more likely to be relevant to the 
decision making processes of self government. 
4. Those who place themselves in a position of being public officials are more 
likely to be prepared for the full-blown discussion of public issues and thus,they 
assume the risk of defamation. Seegmiller at 973-974. 
When analyzed in terms of Seegmiller, Appellant Madsen, even though he is 
a patrolman, could clearly fall within the analysis of a private person as opposed to 
a public figure. As stated before, he is an involuntary news figure. He did not ask 
to be drawn into the Respondents' news report, let alone elevated to the central 
figure in a multi-day, seething attack.He has no standing in the community that 
allows him to fight back. He did not give news conferences or have public relations 
or media coordinators at his disposal. Nothing stated in the attack on his person or 
his reputation demonstrated that he was likely to contribute to the decision making 
process of government. If Respondents found fault in the manner in which the 
Garcia matter was handled, Appellant was clearly without the capability to correct 
the policy which created it. That task would fall to the leadership and supervision 
core of the department, not the patrolman on the scene. Patrolman Madsen's 
decision to serve the citizens of the city as a law enforcement agent may have 
involved the assumption of certain risks, but being the center of a television news 
festival was clearly not one of them. 
Appellant Madsen's position and activities as a patrolman on a major 
metropolitan police department, independent of other factors, does not make him 
a public figure for the purposes of a defamation action. His role and position should 
be examined factually to determine if by virtue of the duties he performs, not just his 
badge and uniform, he is a public or private person. 
B. 
THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE FOR PUBLIC 
INTEREST DOES NOT PROVIDE BLANKET 
PUBLIC OFFICIAL STATUS TO PEACE OFFICERS. 
An event can elevate a private citizen to public interest status, and 
Respondents' alleged that patrolman Madsen became a figure of public importance 
because of his involvement in the shooting of Clemente Garcia, that the public had 
a right to know what was going on and so a special privilege was born for the 
Respondents. The trial court did not rely on special privilege but held Appellant's 
status as a patrolman was sufficient to make him a public figure. Not meaning in any 
13 
way to slight the death of Mr. Garcia, but it should be realized that in 1987 the Salt 
Lake City Police Department took approximately 120,000 calls for assistance. We 
should be able to state with a firm conscience that the number for 1988 must have 
been at least close to that figure. Mr. Garcia was only one of those calls. Many of 
these incidents received wide coverage based upon the interest of the public, but the 
patrolmen who participate in these events should not be automatically thrust into 
public status because there is some interest in the event in which they performed 
their job. 
The "public interest" exception to the ordinary laws of defamation, is founded 
on Utah case law which states that some information is so central to the public 
health and safety that the public ought to be informed about it and that it is 
therefore subject to a qualified privilege.! 
1
 While not an issue in this appeal, it is unlikely that a determination of a public 
person status could stand constitutional muster if it is based only on public interest 
in the incident. 
"[The] use of such subject-matter classification to 
determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded 
defamatory falsehoods may too of ten result in an improper 
balance between the competing interests in this area. It 
was our recognition and rejection of this weakness in the 
Rosenblatttcst which led us in Gertz to eschew a subject 
matter test for one focusing upon the character of the 
defamation of Plaintiff. Time v. Firestone, 424U.S.448, 
456, (1976). See also, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 
U.S. 111,(1979). 
It may be appropriate to examine incidents involving patrolmen to determine 
if a qualified privilege should be applied on a case by case basis, but the mere 
involvement of patrolman does not make such an incident over qualifying for the 
exemption. 
While the public may take interest in the lurid details of any incident which 
causes the death of a human being, the health and safety interest of the community 
are not automatically impacted by such events as the tragic demise of Clemente 
Garcia. That he left his home following a dispute with his wife armed with a 
handgun, that he failed to stop at the repeated insistence of police who followed him 
in a low-speed chase for a substantial distance, that upon finally being stopped he 
pointed his firearm at Patrolman Madsen, drawing the fatal fire of Appellant 
Madsen and other law enforcement agents provides no important information to the 
community that is not already known. All citizens know it is their duty to stop at the 
signal of police. All intelligent beings know that to threaten with a firearm may 
precipitate a deadly response. But even if the rose to such status it must be analyzed 
on an event by event basis. 
That the incident received news coverage by the majority of the media is not 
dispositive. What is of significance is that only the Respondents found the role of 
Appellant of significance. That only the Respondents decided to drag the Appellant 
into the public eye of controversy. That only the Respondents twisted the spotlight 
from Clemente Garcia to Appellant Madsen. 
A police patrolman performs an important job in the structure of society, but 
no more important than other worker level personnel who keep the functions of 
society and business running. A patrolman should not, as a matter of law, be found 
to be a public official. Some patrolmen may well qualify, but all will not and the 
facts of each should be independently judged. 
II 
DETERMINATION OF "PUBLIC OFFICIAL" 
STATUS IN THE INSTANT CASE SHOULD BE A 
FACTUAL ISSUE AND SHOULD BE DECIDED BY 
THE JURY. 
As discussed above, there is no hard and fast rule for determining who is a 
"public officiar and who is not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny 
clearly establish two means by which one may fall into this category. The first are 
those who through their acts and deeds willingly place themselves in the public 
spectacle and assume with it the obligations of risk of attack. This is clearly not the 
case in the instant matter. Patrolman Madsen was in pursuit of his duty throughout 
the episode in question. He, at no point, sought to put himself in the public 
spectacle. 
The second category is reserved for those who, by virtue of their job title, 
assume with their employment, the scrutiny of the public in such a fashion as to 
deprive themselves of the protections against wrongful public attack afforded a 
private individual. This was the basis for the court's ruling. Whether the job of the 
Appellant constitutes such a position necessitates a determination of l)his ability to 
influence and direct the conduct of government, 2) the perception and the import of 
his position from the posture of the ordinary citizen, and 3) his inherent ability to 
rectify wrong and fight back from improper defamation. Appellant's position as a 
patrolman gives him no authority and no position with respect to the establishment 
of government policy or procedure. He, like other citizens, conducts his affairs and 
activities in accordance with those rules, policies and procedures which are 
established by others. 
While the police maintain certain authority with respect to public citizens, all 
public citizens know that that authority is tempered by law. In a community the size 
of Salt lake City, Appellant maintains that the average citizen would find the 
ordinary patrolman to be a person of insufficient influence to be elevated to the risk 
faced by a public official of wrongful public excoriation. 
And finally, the Appellant is clearly without the means or resources to defend 
himself against the actions of the Respondent in the public sector. 
None of these factors are clear.Each is in dispute.In order to determine the 
answer, the fact finder must look at the duties of the Appellant and his relationship 
to the community. 
It is the duty of the Court to view the facts in a defamation case to determine 
if the Appellant is a public person as a matter of law. But the analysis may show that 
the matter is best left to the jury: 
The record here, however, leaves open the possibility that 
respondent could have produced proofs to bring his claim 
outside the New York Times role. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
supra at 87. See also Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp, 
supra; Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126 (Mont. 1978).2 
Thus, while courts have been active in ruling public or non-public status to 
carve out the range of application of the privilege, there is clearly a mid-range of 
cases where the job as such will not define the status. In these cases, factual 
determination must be made to assess there relationship of the Appellant to the 
established standards. 
The analysis of the posture of the Appellant with respect to each of the tests 
for public person status and the ultimate determination of his position as either a 
public or private person is most properly left to the jury to be determined on a 
factual basis, applying the reasonable man standard to the factual realities of the 
Appellant's job. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the court below erred in granting Respondents' 
motion for partial summary judgement against Appellant's First Case of Action. 
The facts of this matter are not such as to designate Appellant Madsen as a 
public person or official as a matter of law within the meaning of the law of 
defamation. He is a private person serving in a position of law enforcement. The 
2
 In Montana the jury looks at both law and fact under instruction from the judge 
in a libel case, however, the decision of the Court looks at the factual issues for 
determination. 
evaluation of his public official status should turn on the individual facts of his case. 
He is without the requisite authority to create police department policy or the 
responsibility of the public spotlight. He is only one of many patrolman in the 
service of the Salt Lake City Police Department who does his job on a routine basis. 
Lastly, the facts in this case are such that they should not have been the 
subject of judicial determination. They were questions of fact which should have 
gone to a jury for decision, not questions of law. The determination of status for the 
purposes of defamation actions should not be a based on a litmus test but rather be 
left to turn on the facts in each individual situation. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the findings and Order 
of the lower court and in so doing deny Respondents' motion for summary 
judgement, and remand the matter for factual determination of Patrolman Madsen's 
status based on his role and responsibility, not just his status as a patrolman. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 31st day of July, 1989 
JEROME^H^MOONEY^ 
Attorney^ or ApTpellaj 
fEY & ASSGOATES 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-5635 
Robert M. Anderson #0108 
Thomas R. Karrenberg #3726 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 532-7520 
Attorneys for Defendant United Television, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DA WD MADSEN, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
UNITED TELEVISION, INC., a : Civil No. C88-1933 
Delaware corporation, and : Judge Homer Wilkinson 
JOHN HARRINGTON, : 
Defendants. : 
ooOoo 
Defendant United Television, Inc.fs motion for partial summary 
judgment came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court on 
November 18, 1988. Plaintiff was represented by Jerome H. Mooney; defendant 
was represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg. After consideration of the moving and 
opposing papers and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds and orders as 
follows: 
The stories broadcast by United Television, Inc. about which plaintiff 
complains all related to plaintiff's performance and record as a Salt Lake City 
Police Officer. Plaintiff, by virtue of his position as a Salt Lake City Police 
Officer is a public of official within the meaning of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and also is a public figure within the meaning of 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Plaintiff is, therefore, required 
to prove actual malice in order to recover in this action. Therefore, defendant 
United TV, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's first cause of 
action is hereby granted. The Court finds that there is no material issue of fact 
and as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to judgment on plaintiff's first cause 
of action. 
DATED: November *- , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Home 
g//4>. 2£_~ U/t ILif JO-y 
er Wilkinson 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED: November Z/ , 1988. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
DATED: November 2 / , 1988. 
MOONEY <5c ASSOCIATES 
S*&+ A<t4*« <2*-/£r^ 
fhomas R. Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
Regular October Term# 1988 January 17/ 1989 
David Madsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 880488 
United Television, Inc./ C88-1933 
a Delaware Corporation, 
and John Harrington, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Appellant's petition for Interlocutory Appeal having 
been considered/ and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises/ it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal be# 
and the same is# granted as prayed. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
